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ABSTRACT  
This paper studies how market-specific entry sunk costs (regulation costs) affect the 
Home Market Effect (HME) with firm heterogeneity in marginal costs. Our model is 
based on the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model with firm heterogeneity plus 
regulation costs difference. We find that a regulation costs gap works as dispersion force 
by inducing a market potential gap, which reduces the HME and could cause the reverse 
HME or the anti-HME. The HME first rises and then fall in terms of trade openness, 
whereas the HME rises in terms of regulation costs gap coordination by technical barriers 
to trade (TBT) agreements. Firm heterogeneity dampens the dispersion force by the 
regulation costs difference and thus works as an agglomeration force. Firm heterogeneity 
causes a perfect spatial sorting, in which a large country attracts only high productivity 
firms, and vice versa.  
 
JEL: F12, F15, R12, R38   
Keywords: home market effect, firm heterogeneity, regulation costs, technical 
barriers to trade 
 
Ce papier étudie comment des coûts d’entrée (coûts de régulation), spécifiques à 
chaque marché, amendent le «Home Market Effect» (HME) en présence de firmes 
hétérogènes en terme de coûts marginaux. Nous trouvons que l’hétérogénéité des 
firmes crée une nouvelle force d’agglomération. Cette hétérogénéité implique un 
classement spatial des firmes en fonction de leur productivité, le grand pays 
attirant les firmes les plus productives. D’autre part, la différence de coûts de 
régulation entre pays induit une force de dispersion des activités, ce qui réduit 
l’effet HME. Nous trouvons alors qu’une libéralisation du commerce renforce 
puis réduit le HME. De plus, une réduction des barrières non tarifaires augmente 
le HME, renforçant donc les inégalités entre pays.  
 
JEL: F12, F15, R12, R38   
Mots clés: Effet du marché domestique, hétérogénéité des firmes, coûts de 
régulation, barrières non tarifaires 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Home Market Effect (HME) is one of the most striking features in the so-called New 
Trade Theory, initiated by Krugman (1980) and Helpman and Krugman (1985): a large 
country could attract a more than proportional share of firms in industries characterised by 
imperfect competition, increasing returns to scale (IRS) and trade costs. Our paper aims at 
examining the effect of country-specific entry costs differences on the HME with firm 
heterogeneity. 
 
Various empirical evidences on the HME have been provided (Davis and Weinstein, 1996, 
1999, and 2003; Redding and Venables, 2004; Trionfetti, 2001).4 To predict these various 
empirical evidences, theory related to the HME has been developed by modifying and 
relaxing some assumptions of the Krugman (1980) and Helpman and Krugman (1985) 
models. For example, Head and Ries (2001) introduced national product differentiation into 
the perfect competition and constant returns to scale (CRS) sector in the Armington approach.  
Davis (1998), which modelled the CRS sector with trade costs, found a kinked firm share 
expenditure share diagram. More recent studies on the HME have sought to explain evidences 
in the multi-country framework (Behrens et al., 2004).5 
 
These laborious efforts for theoretical modification have stemmed from mixed empirical 
evidence. A perfect example is the reverse HME (the production or firm share in the IRS 
sector is less than proportional to the expenditure share in the world, but they still have a 
positive correlation) or anti-HME (the production share is negatively correlated with the 
expenditure share). The reverse HME and anti-HME could be observed in many empirical 
evidences. In response, Head and Mayer (2001) concluded that the cause of the reverse HME 
lies in imperfectly elastic labour. Furthermore, the reverse HME was shown in a non-linear 
HME diagram by Crozet and Trionfetti (2005), introducing trade costs into both IRS and CRS 
sectors. One of the purposes of our paper is to investigate another possibility to explain the 
reverse HME and the anti-HME. We keep Helpman and Krugman’s framework as much as 
possible intact: without modifying the CRS sector and without assuming an inelastic labour 
supply. Our paper modifies the IRS sector by introducing market-specific sunk costs, called 
regulation costs, together with firm marginal costs heterogeneity.  
 
The Current Literature and Our Paper 
 
Before starting a detailed discussion, we review some current studies to put our paper in 
perspective. Since the abolishment of internal tariffs in the middle 1970s, Western Europe has 
been concerned with technical barriers to trade (TBT), such as country-specific regulation and 
standards. In other words, as Baldwin (2000) pointed out, the reduction of tariff barriers has 
led to relatively increase trade distortion of regulatory differences with respect to the location 
of production. In the late 1990s the WTO has sought to reach agreements on the 
harmonisation of these country-specific regulations and standards. This ongoing 
                                                          
4
 Trionfetti (2001) has shown that if consumers’ expenditure is home-biased, the HME could be mitigated. See 
also Trionfetti and Brulhart (2005). 
5
 Behrens et al. (2004) put stress on the impact of the third country effect, in which a small country with good 
access to the other market may well receive a large number of firms: market accessibility crucially affects the 
production share. 
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harmonisation of country-specific regulations has a significant effect on international trade 
(Swann, et al.,1996; Vancauteren, 2002;  Vancauteren and Weiserbs, 2003).6   
 
Behrens and Thisse (2005) 
Turning to the HME discussion, a current provisional study draws attention to the above-
mentioned country-specific sunk costs differences: Behrens and Thisse (2005) suggested that 
the basic impact of the asymmetry in country-specific fixed entry costs dampens the HME. In 
other words, different country-specific market-entry costs work as dispersion force. They 
concluded that the marginal difference of the market entry sunk costs in favour of the small 
country (higher costs in the larger country) reduces the HME. Similarly, our paper also 
provides a model with the market-specific sunk costs, which is positively correlated with 
market size.  
 
HME and Firm Heterogeneity 
The HME has been mentioned in a new research avenue, i.e. the heterogeneous-firms trade 
models, although their focus is not solely on the HME. Indeed, this current research avenue 
has put forward the important consequences of firm’s productivity heterogeneity on 
international trade (See Bernard and Jensen, 1995, 1999a,b, 2001; Tybout, 2003; Eaton et al. 
,2004; Bernard et al. 2003). In response, Melitz (2003) showed the reallocation effect via 
trade liberalisation. Concerning firm heterogeneity and the HME in a theoretical framework, 
there are two streams: one is Melitz (2003), Falvey et al.(2004), Helpman et al. (2003), 
Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2004), Bernard et al. (2004) and Baldwin and Forslid (2004), all 
of which use models with free-entry without delocation, and the other is Baldwin and Okubo 
(2004), which builds on a delocation model without free entry.7 Both streams are common in 
marginal costs differences across firms in the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model.8 
These streams have shown that some selection effects are at work and affect the average 
productivity. Even more importantly related to our paper, all models found the usual HME, 
just as in the homogeneous firm trade model (Helpman and Krugman (1985)).  Next, we 
provide an overview of two seminal papers in more detail.  
 
Melitz (2003) 
This is a seminal paper in international trade in studying firm heterogeneity in the 
monopolistic competition model. Based on Krugman (1980), marginal cost differences (firm 
heterogeneity) and beachhead costs (fixed market-entry sunk costs) are introduced. The model 
never considers firm relocation between countries, but consider free entry. As a consequence, 
Melitz found that: 1) high productivity firms can export, 2) trade liberalisation raises the 
average productivity via a production reallocation effect and via a selection effect, 3) high 
productivity local producers can enter the export market, while low productivity local 
producers exit from the market, and 4) the HME can be always observed.   
 
Baldwin and Okubo (2004) 
This is a pioneering paper in the NEG in investigating the effect of firm heterogeneity on firm 
location, where firm relocation between countries is allowed and instead free market entry is 
prohibited. Their model has no fixed entry costs, unlike the Melitz type model, and resembles 
                                                          
6
 Swann, et al. (1996) found a positive effect on the UK trade. Vancauteren (2002) and Vancauteren and 
Weiserbs (2003) studied the effect of harmonisation on trade in the Gravity Model. 
7
 Baldwin and Okubo (2005) sought to combine Melitz (2003) and Baldwin and Okubo (2004). Okubo (2005) 
studies the spatial sorting by taxation in the vertical linkage model. 
8
 Melitz and Ottaviano (2005) is an exception: the Ottaviano Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) trade model with 
heterogeneous firms. The basic framework is a Melitz mechanism: non-relocation and free entry model. 
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the footloose capital (FC) model of Martin and Rogers (1995) with marginal cost differences, 
i.e. firm heterogeneity. They found that 1) high productivity firms in a small market relocate 
first to a big market (spatial selection effect) as trade gets freer, although low productivity 
firms do not change their locations (one-way spatial sorting), 2) firm heterogeneity dampens 
agglomeration process in terms of the number of firms (firm share), 3) the HME is likely to be 
underestimated in terms of firm share due to firm heterogeneity, regardless of observing the 
HME. However, firm heterogeneity never affects the HME in terms of production share, 
which means the HME in the heterogeneous firm trade model is just equal to the one in the 
homogeneous-firm trade model (i.e. the results in Helpman and Krugman, 1985 and the 
standard FC model) with respect to production share. 
 
Our paper 
Our heterogeneous-firms trade model is in the line of Baldwin and Okubo (2004), i.e. an 
application of firm heterogeneity with delocation but without free-entry. However, while 
Baldwin and Okubo (2004) excludes market entry sunk costs, we introduce country specific 
sunk costs (regulation costs) proportional to market size9. As a result, we find some 
contrasting results compared with Baldwin and Okubo (2004): 1) the regulation costs gap 
results in a market potential difference between countries. This triggers two-way spatial 
sorting (perfect spatial sorting), in which high productivity firms relocate from the small to 
the big country whereas low productivity firms relocate from big to small country, inducing 
an average productivity gap, 2) firm heterogeneity could reduce the dispersion force by the 
regulation costs gap and in fact could promote the agglomeration force, 3) a non-linear HME 
diagram comes into appearance and the reverse HME and anti-HME could also appear when 
the dispersion force is strong, and 4) we could observe the hump-shaped home market 
magnification effect (HMME) in terms of freeness of trade and pro-HMME in terms of 
regulation of policy harmonisation.       
 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the FC model with regulation costs 
differences. Then section 3 introduces firm heterogeneity into the model presented in section 
2. Section 4 shows the results and studies forces at work, and subsequently policy analysis 
and intuition are discussed in section 5. Finally a conclusion is provided in section 6.   
 
 
2. The Model with Homogeneous Firms 
 
 
A. The augmented footloose capital model—the introduction of regulation costs 
differences 
 
This section introduces the basic ingredients of the model with regulation costs in the 
homogeneous firms trade model. Our model is the standard footloose capital (FC) model of 
Martin and Rogers (1995), plus regulation costs (country-specific sunk costs). Suppose a two-
country, i.e. north and south, two-sector, denoted as manufacturing (M) and agriculture (A), 
and two-factor, i.e. physical capital, K, and labour, L, economy. The two countries are 
identical in all ways except their market size (northern share of world expenditure: 
sE=E/(E+E*)), which is a variable in our paper. The total endowment of physical capital and 
labour in the world are respectively normalised to unity (i.e. WK = WL =1). The north is 
assumed to be the larger market. Both countries are endowed with identical relative factor 
                                                          
9
 This assumption does not affect our qualitative results. See appendix 1 for details. 
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supplies. This means that the northern endowment of capital and labour is equally 
proportional to the world share of expenditure (i.e., sE=sK=sL; sK=K/(K+K*) and 
sL=L/(L+L*)). The two factors are inelastically supplied in each country; capital is assumed to 
be mobile, while labour is immobile between countries. However, capital owners are 
immobile between countries. Accordingly, when pressure arises to concentrate manufacturing 
in one country, physical capital moves but its reward is repatriated to its country of origin, 
allowing no expenditure shifting. Importantly, since capital can be separated from capital 
owners, there can be discrepancy between the northern share of capital owners 
(sK=K/(K+K*)) and the northern share of employed capital (the northern firm share) 
(sN=n/(n+n*)).  
The A-sector provides a single homogeneous good that can be freely traded. It is produced 
under CRS and perfect competition with a unit labour requirement. The homogeneous good is 
used as a numeraire. Without loss of generality, its price is set equal to 1, so that both 
countries’ wages are equal to 1. On the other hand, the M-sector produces a differentiated 
good under the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition, characterised by the presence of IRS 
with costly trade (i.e. with iceberg trade costs). The cost function of a typical manufacturing 
variety is characterised by a variable cost which involves labour, while one unit of capital is 
employed as fixed cost per firm.   
On the demand side, the utility function takes the standard quasi-linear form with a CES sub-
utility function for the differentiated good produced by the M-sector: 
AM CCU += lnµ , 
σ
σ
/11
1
/11
−
Θ∈
−








= ∫ iM cC  
where MC  and AC  are, respectively, consumption of the composite of M-sector varieties and 
consumption of the A-sector good, σ, is the constant elasticity of substitution between any 
two varieties and Θ  is the set of all varieties produced. This set is predetermined by 
endowments since each variety requires a given (and exogenous) amount of capital and the 
world capital stock is fixed. The demand for any variety k is given by: 
σ
σ
µ
−
Θ∈
−
∫
= k
i
k pp
E
c
1  
Now we add regulation costs to the above FC model, which are beachhead costs and 
implicitly thought of as sunk costs for firms’ operations, sales and business promotion.10 The 
regulation costs involve labour. The literature suggests that there are multiple costs associated 
with launching a new business (see Djankov et al (2002)). In particular, Behrens and Thisse 
(2005) mentioned that these “range from fixed production costs, specialized infrastructure 
(such as those needed to load and unload cargo) and land on which plants are built, on the one 
end of the spectrum, to legal procedures, registration fees and administrative delays, on the 
other. There is no doubt that all these costs considerably vary across countries.”  
The country-specific sunk costs (regulation costs) as shown in Behrens and Thisse (2005) are 
discussed in our paper, although our set up is different from theirs on two points. First, their 
study focuses on how a small difference of country-specific sunk costs between two countries 
affects the number of firms and the HME in the framework of Ottaviano et al. (2003). On the 
other hand, our model attempts to study the impact of country-specific sunk (regulation) costs 
on the HME in the framework of Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition model with firm 
heterogeneity. The second difference from Behrens and Thisse (2005) is the market-size-
dependence of the sunk costs in our paper: proportional to market size (expenditure share and 
                                                          
10
  For the beachhead costs, see Baldwin (1989). 
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equally population share in our quasi-linear utility function model) for simplicity’s sake.11 
According to Mulligan and Schleifer (2004) and Demsetz (1967), regulation levels are 
positively correlated with population and market size in the market.12 Applying this idea, 
regulation costs are modelled in the simplest way, which is proportional to the market size 
(expenditure share and population) with a linear function for simplicity:13 
EN sR β=  
)1( ES sR −= β   
where Es  is the share of northern expenditure as well as the northern population (the number 
of workers and capital owners) share (because of sE=sL=sK). This allows us to keep symmetry 
with respect to sE: symmetric market sizes result in identical production shares between the 
countries due to the same regulation costs.14 Utilising this regulation costs set-up, pure profits 
in each country can be expressed as15:  
*
1W E E
N EW
N orthern M arket Potential
s sE
s
N
µ
pi φ β
σ
− 
= + − ∆ ∆ 1442443
 
*
1 (1 )
W
E E
S EW
Southern M arket Potential
s sE
s
N
µ
pi φ β
σ
− 
= + − − ∆ ∆ 1442443
 
where WE (world income) and WN (total number of firms) can be normalised to unity, and φ is 
the ‘free-ness’ of trade: 10 1σφ τ −≤ ≡ ≤  (from 0 with prohibitive iceberg trade costs to 1 with 
zero iceberg trade costs), and ∆ (∆*) (a mnemonic for the denominator of the standard CES 
demand function) reflects the degree of competition in the north (the south): 
(1) ( )1N Ns sφ∆ = + − and ( )NN ss −+=∆ 1* φ  
 
B. Equilibrium and the impact of regulation costs differences 
 
In equilibrium, profits between the two countries are equalised:  
(2)    ( )*0 (1 ) (2 1)N S EB B sµpi pi φ βσ− = ⇔ − − = −  
where 
∆
≡
EsB  and
*
* 1
∆
−
≡
EsB ,which is thought of as per-firm demand in each country, i.e. 
total market expenditure divided by a term that stands for the overall degree of competition in 
its market.  We call )( *BB φ+  and )( *BB +φ the market potential in the north and the south 
respectively.  
                                                          
11
 See Sutton (1991) for detailed discussion on endogenous sunk costs. 
12
 According to Mulligan and Schleifer (2004), heavily populated states are likely to regulate more activities and 
regulate each activity in more detail. In order to achieve some kind of uniformity, the big states are more likely 
to resort to rules and regulations rather than market mechanism. This causes firms to pay higher fixed costs to 
satisfy more regulations. They suggested that population is an empirically crucial determinant of regulation. 
Demsetz (1967) suggested that the creation of institution and regulation is determined by market size. 
13
 In the quasi-linear utility function model, the share of expenditure is just equal to the share of population.  
14
 This is convenient and beautiful in the course of the discussion in the HME, namely the slope of the 
relationship between the share of expenditure and the share of production in a two-country world. Moreover, it is 
worth to note that this simplicity has no influence on our main results about the impact of the asymmetry in 
market potential and in the driving force by firm heterogeneity. 
15
 We assume the marginal cost equals to 
σ
σ 1−
 . This allows the price of a representative variety to be unity, 
like in the standard FC model. 
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The introduction of regulation costs amends some results from the standard FC model. First of 
all, regulation costs play the role of dispersion force, similar to the result in Behrens and 
Thisse (2005)16. Since firms have to pay higher regulation costs in the north than in the south, 
the incentive to locate in the north diminishes. Intuitively, the North must cope with less 
production (and thus less competition) than in the standard FC model due to the higher 
regulation costs. The second point, which is the most important mechanism in the discussion 
below, is that the presence of regulation costs creates a gap in market potential between the 
countries. With higher regulation costs in the large market, firms can enjoy the benefit from 
the higher market potential. In other words, the burden of higher regulation costs payment 
protects the higher profits in the north. Thus )( *BB φ+ > )( *BB +φ  always holds, as long as the 
north is larger than the south in market size. This is because B>B* always holds when sE>0.5 
in equation (2). Intuitively, the higher regulation costs in the larger market prevent firm 
location in the large market and deter the agglomeration process. This result contrasts with 
any other studies. In the NEG literature, the market potential is always equalised through free 
delocation in equilibrium. (See the standard FC model and Baldwin and Okubo (2004) 
(2005).) Also in the Melitz type of firm heterogeneity models, the market potential is 
equalised by free entry. 
 
Result 1: Regulation costs gap in favour of a small market (lower regulation costs in the 
small market, and vice versa) works as dispersion force. The presence of the regulation 
gap between countries leads to a market potential difference between countries: the 
larger market has the higher market potential. 
 
 
C. The Measurement of the Home Market Effect  
 
A big difference compared to the other papers is the market potential difference between the 
countries due to the regulation costs gap. This implies that each firm has different levels of 
production and pure profits between the two countries. Thus, the HME cannot simply measure 
the relationship between the size of expenditure and the number of firms. Since the HME 
measures the relationship between the relative size of expenditure and the relative size of 
production, it should take into account the difference of production between firms located in 
different countries. To work this out, the production share can be written as a function of the 
expenditure share:  
(3)  )1)(()(
)(
**
*
nn
n
P
sBBsBB
sBB
s
−+++
+
= φφ
φ
 
This can be simplified:  
                                                       nP sBBs )( *φ+=  
It follows that the production share weighs the share of the number of firms by their market 
potential. Figure 1 plots the equation (2) using sP as index. We add the 45° line, which means 
no HME (no bias in production share), and the classic HME line (without any regulation costs 
gap), (1+φ)/(1-φ)>1, as shown in the FC model and Helpman and Krugman (1985)’s model, 
for making a good comparison. In the extreme case, if we take a high value of β  to highlight 
the dispersion force, the regulation costs term becomes large. This largely dampens the HME 
and could yield a correlation of less than 1 or even a negative correlation in terms of 
production and expenditure shares; respectively the reverse HME: the production share is less 
                                                          
16
 Behrens and Thisse (2005) mainly studied the case where a large market has high country-specific entry costs, 
which is the same as our model.  
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than proportional to the expenditure share, and the anti-HME: the production share is 
negatively correlated with the expenditure share. With respect to the home market 
magnification effect (HMME), we observe the hump-shaped relationship: As trade gets freer, 
we observe the increased HME with high trade costs (small φ) and the decreased HME with 
low trade costs (high φ). 
Finally, in order to compare with the HME diagram in the previous studies, the equation (2) 
can be re-written in terms of firm share and expenditure share: 
                            (4)   ( ) ( )
2
2
Re cos
2 ( ) (1 )10.5 0.5 1
1 (1 )
n n
n E
gulation tsclassical HME
s s
s s
φβ φφ σ
φ µ φ
  
− +  
− +   − = − − 
− +  
 
 
1444442444443123
 
The regulation costs term is always positive and thus dampens the HME as dispersion force. 
To confirm the analytical solution, we plot the equation in terms of sn and sE. Figure 1 shows 
the production share with respect to the northern expenditure share in the world.  
 
 
Result 2: The HME is reduced by the presence of regulation costs differences in favour 
of the small market. The HMME is hump-shaped. 
 
Result 3: The HME diagram can be a non-linear production share expenditure share 
diagram.17 
 
Result 4: The rise of the regulation costs gap reduces the HME. In particular, the 
reverse HME (and the anti-HME) could be observed for a high regulation costs gap (a 
high value of β ).   
 
 
Se
1
1
Sp
1/2
1/2
Classic HME
With regulation 
costs
 
Figure 1: The Effect of Regulation Costs Gap on the HME 
 
 
                                                          
17
 The non-linear diagram was found also in Crozet and Trionfetti (2005), although the framework is totally 
different from ours: both IRS and CRS sectors are costly traded in the Helpman and Krugman (1985) model. 
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3. Introduction of Firm Heterogeneity 
 
A. Specification 
 
Having described the basic properties of the FC model with regulation costs gap, we can now 
turn to the introduction of firm heterogeneity, keeping the utility function and demand 
function as in the last section.18 We introduce firm marginal cost heterogeneity following the 
manner of Baldwin and Okubo (2004) and (2005) and Okubo (2005), which do not cover all 
features in Melitz (2003): marginal costs differences without free entry but with delocation. 
As seen in Figure 2, we model firm heterogeneity in marginal costs, ‘a’, according to the 
Pareto distribution, bounded between 0 and 1. We define f(a) as the density function and F(a) 
as the cumulative density function: 
1
0
1
)( −
−
=







=
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρρ a
a
a
af , 1,01 0 ≥≥≥≡ ρaa  
ρ
ρ
a
a
a
aF =





=
0
)(  
where ρ is a shape parameter. A higher ρ induces a more concentrated distribution of firms at 
the end of the spectrum (close to a=1), which implies the convergence to homogeneity when ρ 
goes to infinity. The average marginal cost is given by ρ/(ρ+1). High ρ means a higher 
average marginal cost. We assumes a continuous drawing of firms from the underlying 
distribution F[a], with support [0; 1]; this yields a mass of potential firms nF[a] in north and 
n*F[a] in south (n>n* since the northern market is larger). 
 
B. The Perfect Spatial Sorting (two-way sorting) 
 
As in the homogeneous firms model, firms face a trade-off between higher regulation costs 
payment and higher operating sales and profits in the larger country, and vice versa. The gap 
of operating profits comes from market potential difference between the countries due to the 
regulation costs gap:  
(5)  ( ) )12()1( 1* −−−−=− − ESN spBB βφσ
µ
pipi σ
 
Different from the homogeneous-firms trade model, the gap of operating profits is different 
across firms due to marginal cost differences (firm heterogeneity): the highest productivity 
firms make the biggest profits, as seen in Melitz (2003) and Baldwin and Okubo (2004).  
Furthermore, different from the other heterogeneous-firms trade models, the regulation costs 
gap is location-dependent. Combined with these two features, the gap of pure profits is 
proportional not only to each firm’s productivity but also to the market potential in each 
country. Consequently, this productivity-dependent and country-dependent operating profit 
leads to a spatial sorting of firms between countries in response to their own productivity. The 
Nash equilibrium is a perfect spatial sorting; all high productivity firms concentrate in the 
bigger market while low productivity firms locate in the small market.19 Due to free relocation 
all firms can relocate seeking higher profits. High productivity firms can get higher profits in 
the large expenditure market as a return for higher regulation costs payments. On the other 
                                                          
18
 Note that the demand side is still homogeneous, i.e. identical consumers, which are not affected by firm 
heterogeneity. Also, no demand linkage is still satisfied by the quasi-linear utility function. 
19
 These Nash equilibrium features are independent of the probability distribution function of marginal costs. The 
spatial sorting outcome is not affected by the distribution of firm heterogeneity.  
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hand, low productivity firms cannot bear higher regulation costs and prefer to locate in the 
small demand market and get smaller profits.20  In other words, as seen in Figure 2, there 
exists one cut-off efficiency level, Ca , where there exists indifference in profits between the 
north and the south, and all firms above Ca  are in the south, while all firms below Ca  locate 
in the north. Ca  is determined by the following equation: 
  
   (6)          ( ) 0)12()1(1)()( 1*
/11
=−−−−




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Result 5: Firm heterogeneity leads to a perfect spatial sorting in the presence of market 
potential difference: all high productivity firms concentrate in the large (expenditure 
share) country and all low productivity firms concentrate in the small (expenditure 
share) country. Thus, the market potential difference from the regulation costs gap leads 
to the perfect spatial sorting, resulting in a gap of average productivity between 
countries.21 
                                                          
                                                     Figure 2: Relocation Tendency 
 
Intuitively, when the northern market potential is higher, the north is more attractive than the 
south. As a consequence of the market potential gap, the most efficient firms located in the 
large market enjoy the benefit of large (expenditure) market access advantage in the north. 
However, higher regulation costs in the north crowd out the least efficient firms from the 
north, because they are not productive enough to cover the high regulation costs with its 
operating profits. This causes the perfect sorting, creating a productivity gap between 
countries.  
The spatial perfect sorting effect (two-way sorting) in our model stands definitely in contrast 
to Baldwin and Okubo (2004) and Melitz (2003). In the Melitz model, the perfect spatial 
sorting never happens: the mass of operating firms is determined by the free entry condition, 
and over the whole range of productivity, a=0 to 1, firms locate in each market and only a 
fraction of firms at each level of productivity is determined by the free entry condition.  
In Baldwin and Okubo (2004), the spatial sorting is one-way (selection effect): the most 
efficient firms in the small market are likely to relocate to the large market, while the least 
efficient firms in the large market stay in the large market. This is because the market 
                                                          
20
 Although the perfect (two-way) spatial sorting cannot be exactly verified by empirical studies, many supported 
findings have been provided. (See Mion and Naticchioni 2005, Combes Duranton and Gobillon 2004, Head and 
Ries 2003). 
21
 Note that in the homogeneous-firms trade model, there does not exist an average productivity gap due to the 
identical marginal costs for all firms.  
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potential in the large market is always higher than in the small market for all firms, but they 
never incur any high location-specific sunk costs in the large market as in our paper, and 
consequently the least efficient firms always make higher pure profits in the large market.  
Therefore, spatial sorting is one-way: only the efficient firms in a small market relocate to the 
big market. 
By contrast to these previous models, the presence of a regulation costs gap together with   
free relocation results in two-way spatial sorting. The higher regulation costs in the north lead 
to a higher market potential in equilibrium, causing higher pure profits and average 
productivity, but on the other hand, firms below a given level of productivity cannot cover the 
higher regulation costs and relocate to the small country.  
 
C. The Degree of Competition 
Based on the result of the perfect spatial sorting, we can characterise the manufacturing price 
index, P=
1
1 σ−∆ . First, ∆, the degree of competition, can be expressed as: 
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From equation (7), two points are worthwhile noting. First, λ , a decreasing function of ρ , 
determines the impact of the average marginal cost on the degree of competition. A lower 
average marginal cost (small ρ  and thus large λ) stimulates overall competition so that ∆ 
rises. Second, the cut-off efficiency level, ca , reflects how the spatial sorting affects 
competition in each country. The cut-off level is largely dependent on the probability 
distribution in marginal costs. A high degree of firm heterogeneity decreases the cut-off level 
marginal cost, if other things are equal. The increased cut-off (for a given degree of firm 
heterogeneity) promotes competition in the north such that ∆ rises.  
 
 
 
 
4. The Effect of Firm Heterogeneity on the Home 
Market Effect  
 
 
In this section, first of all, we plot the production share with the expenditure share, as in the 
usual HME diagram. Next, in order to rigorously examine the effect of firm heterogeneity on 
the HME, we make a detailed comparison of diagrams between the heterogeneous-firms trade 
model and the homogeneous-firms trade model, given the same level of overall competition. 
Finally, we provide an analytical solution to get intuition and explain the forces at work 
around the symmetric equilibrium.  
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A. Home Market Effect (General case) 
 
Following the definition of sP index in the last section,   
(8) 
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From the Pareto distribution, sn can be written as: 
 
(9) N Cs aρ=  
 
As in the standard HME discussion, Figure 4 plots the sE-sP relation from equations (8) and 
(10) and also plots the sE-sn relation from equations (9) and (10) 22: 
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Figure 3: HME (Production Share and Firm Share) 
 
                                                          
22
 To compare with equation (4) in the homogeneous-firms model, we can rewrite equation (10) as 
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Figure 4: The Effect of Regulation Costs with Firm Heterogeneity 
 
First, the HME in terms of production share is still at work as illustrated in Figure 3. 
However, the reverse HME can be observed like in the homogeneous-firm trade model. Note 
that without any regulation costs, i.e. 0=β , the HME is the same as the classical HME, i.e. 
1
1
1
>
−
+
φ
φ
. By contrast, if we take a high value of β, then the reverse HME is obtained, as seen 
in Figure 4. The reverse HME is caused by a sufficient level of the regulation costs gap 
(high β ), just as in the homogeneous-firm case discussed in the last section. 
Second, the diagram is a non-linear diagram and is concave. The concavity results from the 
decreased productivity in the cut-off level firms. The firms at the cut-off efficiency level, 
which are indifferent to their location due to identical pure profits, become less efficient (‘ ca ’ 
gradually increases) as the increased sE induces more firms to relocate from the south (low 
productivity firms agglomeration) to the north (high productivity firms agglomeration).  
In contrast to the convexity in the homogeneous-firms trade model (Figure 1), the concavity 
shape in Figure 4 implies that firm heterogeneity reduces the dispersion force induced by the 
regulation costs gap. This comes from the average productivity gap caused by the perfect 
spatial sorting in the heterogeneous-firms trade model (the average productivity is equal 
between countries in the homogeneous-firms trade model). 
Third, it is also important to note that the impact of trade freeness (φ ) on the HME follows a 
non-linear relationship: a hump-shaped HMME is obtained, as in the homogeneous-firms 
trade model (Figure 5). With high trade costs, trade cost reduction increases the HME. On the 
contrary, if trade is almost free, trade liberalisation causes to decrease the HME. This 
markedly contrasts to the standard FC model and the Helpman and Krugman (1985) model. 
Also, this is substantially different from Baldwin and Okubo (2004)’s result, in which the 
HMME is measured by firm share but the HME and the HMME are correspondent to the 
standard FC model in terms of production share. 
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                                 Figure 5: Trade Liberalisation and the HME 
 
B. The impact of firm heterogeneity----a comparison between the homogeneous-firms 
model and the heterogeneous-firms model 
 
To highlight the precise impact of firm heterogeneity, we compare the heterogeneous firms 
trade model with the homogeneous firms trade model by equalising the level of the overall 
competition. Comparing the degree of competition between equations (1) and (7), we can get 
the relationship ∆het=λ∆hom. Using this relationship, we equalise parameter values between 
the homogeneous (hom) case and the heterogeneous (het) case by keeping σ and λ constant 
and only controlling µ  :  
(10)
{ {
caseogeneouscaseousheterogene
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hom
hom
σ
µ
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µ
=  
Under this condition, Figure 6 plots these two cases: 
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                                          Figure 6: The Impact of Firm Heterogeneity 
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The average marginal cost in the north is always lower in the heterogeneous case than in 
the homogeneous case due to the perfect spatial sorting. In other words, high productivity 
firms concentrate in the north, while low productivity firms concentrate in the south in the 
heterogeneous-firms trade model. This leads to relatively more northern production and 
relatively less southern production. Therefore, the northern production share is higher in the 
heterogeneous case than in homogeneous case for a given sE>0.5. As a consequence, firm 
heterogeneity works as agglomeration force and yields more possibilities for full 
agglomeration.  
 
Result 6: Firm heterogeneity works as agglomeration force by dampening the dispersion 
force induced by the regulation costs gap.  
 
Intuitively, as shown in the last section, the market potential is not equalised due to the 
regulation costs gap. However, since firms are identical in productivity in the homogeneous 
case, the regulation costs gap translates into different market potentials but no spatial sorting 
occurs and average productivity is always the same between the countries. Therefore, the 
productivity gap does not exist in the homogeneous-firm model. By contrast, our 
heterogeneous-firm trade model features a substantial average productivity gap between the 
countries due to the perfect spatial sorting. As a result of the sorting, the average productivity 
must be higher in the north. This higher average productivity increases the production share in 
the north, because firms can bear the higher regulation costs more easily. Hence, the share of 
northern production is higher than in the homogeneous-firms model.  
A further comparison can be made with respect to the other heterogeneous-firms trade 
models. In Melitz (2003), the free entry model without relocation, firms with all levels of 
production always stay in the market and instead the number of firms is adjusted so as to 
equalise the market potential between countries. Even more importantly, Baldwin and Okubo 
(2004) and (2005), the delocation model without free entry, suggested that the HME in terms 
of production share in their heterogeneous-firms model corresponds to the one in the 
homogeneous-firms model (Martin and Rogers, 1995). Therefore, they concluded that firm 
heterogeneity works as dispersion force only in the share of number of firms, but it has no 
influence on the production share. 
 
C. Another Home Market Magnification Effect---TBT 
 
The traditional discussion on trade liberalisation focused on reducing trade costs. However, 
many other kinds of barriers still remain in place among the developed countries such as 
different production standards, technical regulations, and competition policy. Many large 
differences in regulations create obstacles for producers and exporters. Since these barriers 
crucially impede free international trade and investment in the current low-trade-costs world, 
the WTO has put the issues on the table in the technical barriers to trade agreement (TBT). 
The WTO agreement encourages countries to appropriately adopt international standards as 
much as possible, although each country is not necessarily required to change its level of 
standards for keeping diversity. Turning to our model, the regulation costs harmonisation in 
the profit function represents the decrease of ‘β’, which can be a policy variable. Accordingly, 
the TBT agreement can be thought of as a reduction of β. Now, our paper provides another 
notion of the HMME: the HMME in terms of regulation costs, β, where the traditional 
HMME has focused only on trade costs reduction, φ. From equation (6), we can induce the 
following relationship: 
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This implies that the reduction of β, i.e. the harmonisation in the market regulation policy 
between countries, promotes the HME for any level of β. As the TBT agreement promotes the 
harmonisation of regulation policies across countries, the regulation costs are reduced. As a 
result, it promotes production more than proportional in the large country. This is another 
HMME. 23 
 
Result 7: The regulation costs reduction and harmonisation, β, increases the HME for 
any levels of regulation costs. This is the HMME in terms of TBT agreement. 
 
    
D. The Home Market Effect around the symmetric equilibrium (local analysis) 
 
To analytically solve and get more intuition, we provide the simple representation of the HME 
around the symmetric equilibrium (i.e. sE around 0.5), which is useful to confirm the previous 
results on the forces of firm heterogeneity. Moreover, this local analysis makes it possible to 
obtain the critical values of the regulation costs gap for the reverse HME and the anti-HME 
around the symmetric equilibrium. The total differentiation around the symmetry is given by: 
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As in the traditional HME discussion, two opposing forces are at work in our model: a market 
access effect (MAE), which creates a centripetal force, and a market crowding effect (MCE), 
which creates a centrifugal force24. The MAE corresponds to nominators, while the MCE 
reflects the denominators in equation (12). The MCE is affected only by φ. By contrast, the 
MAE is affected by firm heterogeneity and the regulation costs difference. Compared to the 
HME results in the standard FC model and Helpman and Krugman’s model, the MAE is 
lowered by an increase in regulation costs as well as by a low degree of firm heterogeneity 
(high λ). Hence, it is more likely to find a negative relationship between sP and Es  (anti-HME) 
for a sufficiently large regulation costs gap and a low degree of firm heterogeneity. As the 
regulation costs gap increases, the small country attracts more firms from the large country. 
Moreover, less firm heterogeneity promotes the possibility of the reversed HME and the anti-
HME.  
 
Critical values for the reverse HME and the anti-HME 
                                                          
23
 It is also worth noticing that such regulatory harmonization reduces the impact of firm heterogeneity on the 
location of production. 
24
 In the standard (homogeneous-firm) FC model and Baldwin and Okubo (2004) (heterogeneous-firm FC 
model), the HME in terms of production share is written as
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Now, we derive critical β values for the reverse HME and the anti-HME around the 
symmetric equilibrium. The value of β to allow the reverse HME, namely βˆ , is given by25: 
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Similarly, we can derive the critical value for the anti-HME, β~ :   
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Note that β~ > βˆ always holds. If β is less than βˆ , the usual HME can be observed. However, 
the reverse HME can be found with β larger than βˆ  but less than β~ . In turn, the anti-HME 
can be found for values of β larger than β~ .  
 
Result 8: Firm heterogeneity, ceteris paribus, promotes the agglomeration process by 
means of raising the market access effect. Hence, firm heterogeneity promotes the HME 
and reduces the possibility of the reverse HME and the anti-HME. 
 
Result 9: The higher regulation costs, β, ceteris paribus, induce the reverse HME and 
the anti-HME. 
 
 
5. Regulation Policy Implication 
 
This section discusses some more implications on regulation policy, β, based on our 
heterogeneous-firms trade model. Our crucial results are different market potential and 
average productivity discrepancy due to the regulation costs gap. Here, we discuss one of 
many possible policies. We examine the harmonisation of regulation policy through 
international agreements when policy aims at enhancing welfare.       
 
Regulatory harmonisation 
In this section, we discuss regulation policy harmonisation by means of welfare in the 
framework of two countries with almost equal market sizes (local analysis in section 4). 
Suppose the model with a substantial regulation costs, i.e. a large β, around symmetric 
equilibrium: sE=0.5+ε. We consider a substantially high level of country specific regulation 
costs, but the regulation costs gap is small due to similar market sizes. First of all, welfare can 
be represented as the indirect quasi-linear utility function: )ln( 1
1
−∆+−= σµµµEU  in the 
north and )ln( 1
1
***
−∆+−= σµµµEU in the south.  
From the equation (5), the market potential gap, B>B*, can always be found as long as a 
regulation costs gap exists. This relationship induces ∆<∆* when sE is around 0.5. This 
means that the relatively large country has a lower degree of competition. Utilising this 
                                                          
25We must ensure that the least efficient firm in the south still have a non negative pure profit. This  leads to the 
following condition on β , which is also compatible with the values of βˆ and β~  :  
σλ
µβpi 20 <⇔>S  
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relationship, the northern welfare is less than southern one: U<U*. All the people in the 
relatively small country can gain higher welfare than in the relatively large country around the 
symmetric equilibrium. In this situation, a small number of the northern high productivity 
firms supplies a bunch of products with lower prices but the number of its produced varieties 
is very small (less varieties but more production), consequently lowering ∆, while a large 
number of the southern low productivity firms produce smaller quantities (for each firm) with 
higher prices (more varieties but less per-firm production and higher price) and consequently 
increases ∆*. This is consistent with the result in Figure 4, in which sN is close to 0 but sP is 
more than 0.5 around symmetric equilibrium. This lower welfare in the north triggers more 
incentive for the north to harmonise regulation policy. Therefore, if governments can control 
β by regulation policy to enhance welfare, the north (a relatively large country) has more 
incentive to reduce β and could initiate an international regulatory harmonisation agreement. 
This result might more or less reflect the stylised facts that small developing countries are 
likely to have a negative attitude to the international harmonisation agreements (TBTs 
international agreements in the WTO). This is also consistent with the result of Ganslandt and 
Markusen (2001).26     
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
We studied the Home Market Effect in the presence of country-specific sunk costs, i.e. 
regulation costs, to reflect the on-going trade liberalisation with respect to technical trade 
barriers. We modelled firm heterogeneity and regulation costs with delocation but without 
free market entry. The regulation costs, proportional to market size, work as a dispersion force 
due to higher regulation costs in the large country. This could cause the reverse HME, the 
anti-HME and humped-shape HMME in terms of production share, contrasting with Baldwin 
and Okubo (2004) which suggested no impact of firm heterogeneity on the HME in terms of 
production share. Also, firm heterogeneity results in a perfect spatial sorting (two-way 
sorting) in our model: all high productivity firms concentrate in the large country, while the 
small country attracts all low productivity firms, causing higher average productivity and 
market potential in the large country. As a result, firm heterogeneity works as agglomeration 
force through dampening the dispersion force caused by the regulation costs gap. This perfect 
sorting result is very important in our paper and largely depends on the presence of regulation 
costs differences. In other words, the regulation costs gap crucially affects the location of 
production and average productivity. This reflects the importance of the TBT and regulatory 
harmonisation. Furthermore, the TBT issue has been discussed: the reduction of regulation 
costs through harmonisation in standards and regulation policy. We suggest that this kind of 
liberalisation could promote the HME (pro-HMME in terms of regulatory liberalisation). As 
policy implications, our model would predict that larger countries could take initiative in 
international agreements on regulation and standards, while the small countries are likely to 
hesitate to agree with international standards and stick to their own country-specific 
regulations. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26
 They concluded that a smaller and poorer country cannot get the international standards and only a large 
country can enjoy the benefits of international agreements. 
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Appendix 1: Robustness Check 
 
This Appendix aims at showing how our main results in our model are robust in various 
specifications for regulation costs. In our model the regulation costs are assumed to be a linear 
function of expenditure (population) share for the simplicity. However, even if we drop this 
assumption and introduce a non-linear function, the qualitative results never change under the 
condition of higher regulation costs in the north. Further, even in the case of the regulation 
costs influenced not only by the location of production but also by the export market in a 
certain degree (for instance, ))1(( EEN ssR −+= δβ , where δ<1), the results can be fully kept 
as in our main model. 
Another thought experiment is fixed regulation costs (meaning that NR  and SR are constant 
and exogenous), which are higher in the big country but are not proportional to its population 
and market size. In this set-up, although a symmetric relationship between sE and sP collapses 
(i.e. the HME phase line never cuts 0.5-0.5 point in sP-sE diagram), the qualitative results are 
the same as in our model. Equation (10) can be rewritten as: 
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Again, the presence of a regulation cost gap in favour of the south reduces the northern 
production share, and allows the spatial sorting of firms where the most efficient firms locate 
in the north. This leads to raise an average productivity gap in the north, increasing its share 
of production compared to the homogeneous case. Thus, all qualitative results are kept. 
Finally, ignoring the empirical evidence by Mulligan and Schleifer (2004) of a positive 
correlation of regulation costs with population and market size, we consider an opposite case 
as thought experiment: higher regulation costs in the small country and lower regulation in the 
large country. In this set-up, regulation costs work as agglomeration force and promote the 
HME. Firm heterogeneity causes a totally opposite direction of the two-way sorting, in which 
all low productivity firms concentrate in the large country while all high productivity firms 
locate in the small country. However, importantly these results do not seem to be feasible in 
the actual world and definitely contradict any recent empirical studies. Lafourcade and Mion 
(2003) and Alsleben (2005) have shown empirical evidences that large firms are more likely 
to be found in agglomerated areas, which have a big market size and large expenditure. For 
this reason, following Mulligan and Schleifer (2004) and Demsetz (1972), our model sets up 
the regulation costs function that is positively correlated with population.     
 
Appendix 2: The Hump-shaped HMME—an analytical solution 
 
Differentiating the equation (12) in terms of φ, we can derive: 
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found, while the reverse HMME can be observed with low trade costs, φ
α
α
<
+
−
21
21
. This 
means that, as trade gets freer, the HME first rises and then falls.   
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